Testimony and Sexuality: or, Queer Structures of Religious Feeling: Notes Toward an Investigation by Pellegrini, Ann
Fall 2005                                                                                                             93
Testimonial Sexuality; or, Queer Structures of Religious 
Feeling:  Notes Towards an Investigation
Ann Pellegrini
This short essay emerges at a slant to the arguments Janet R. Jakobsen and I 
developed together in Love the Sin:  Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious 
Tolerance.1 That book grew out of a set of dissatisfactions that Jakobsen and I 
share about the impoverishment of public arguments on behalf of lesbian and gay 
“rights” in the United States. We believe that an emphasis on “rights” rather than 
“freedom” is already part of the problem, and that lgbtq advocates are asking for 
too little when they ask for “tolerance” and “equality.” As long-time progressive and 
lesbian activist Amber Hollibaugh has said, equal rights should be the basement, 
not the ceiling, of aspirations for social justice.2
The joint venture of Love the Sin emerged, too, out of Jakobsen’s and my 
shared frustration at the impoverishment of academic discourse about religion, 
especially at the way religion does and does not feature in the critical discourses 
with which we have both been centrally engaged. Many scholars of religion have 
long been engaging questions of gender and sexuality, but scholars working in 
gender and sexuality studies have not been similarly interested in religion as a 
vector of identity and the social. As historian Ann Taves puts the matter, in her 
fascinating study Fits, Trances, and Visions:  Experiencing Religion and Explaining 
Experience from Wesley to James, “Contemporary historians of difference are 
preoccupied with matters of race, gender, sexual orientation, but they rarely attend 
to the parallel processes by means of which religious difference or identity was 
(and is) constructed.”3 At a time when religious discourse—really, Protestant 
discourse—frames American public debates over homosexuality, the lack of 
exchange between critical approaches to the study of religion, on the one hand, 
and gender and sexuality studies, on the other, is more than simply an “academic” 
issue. What critical resources for rethinking the scope of intellectual and activist 
projects are lost by this relative inattention to “religion”? 
Given my own institutional location—I have a joint appointment in religious 
studies and performance studies—I also have a vested interested in considering 
whether and how the rubric of “performance” might enrich both the conceptual 
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vocabulary and political imagination for jointly engaging questions of religion and 
sexuality. One way performance studies can do this is by underscoring the vital role 
of practice, or performance, for both religious and sexual “identities.” Thinking 
through the category of performance interrupts essentialist notions of what religion 
“is” and shifts critical attention to the complex and sometimes discomforting ways 
religion comes to mean for individuals and communities. 
Feminist and queer theories have developed wonderfully supple accounts of 
the importance of “doing” or enacting identity.4 However, in general, when religion 
has entered into the frame of queer and even feminist academic analyses, it has 
tended to do so in highly belief-centered terms in which religion gets ﬁgured as the 
expression of irrational superstition, fear, archaic holdover, modernity’s remainder. 
Under the burden of such representations of religion, religious people are, at best, 
silly; at worst, they are the enemy of, variously, women, queers, progress, equality, 
freedom, futurity itself. However, such blanket proclamations as “religion is the 
enemy” forget more than they know. They forget or overlook the many self-
identiﬁed feminists, gay men, lesbians for whom religion remains a vital site of 
collective belonging and meaning-making life practices. They read past the best 
selling non-ﬁction list at most gay and lesbian bookstores, a list dominated by books 
about religion and spirituality, with such titles as Daniel A. Helminiak’s What the 
Bible Really Says About Homosexuality, a perennial (and much-reprinted) best-
seller.5 Doubtless, many of the readers of Helminiak’s book—and other books like 
it—are seeking ammunition, ways, that is, to defend themselves against Biblically-
based homophobia. However, it is important to acknowledge, too, the many lgbtq 
people who do not think they should have to choose between “being” queer and 
“being” religious and for whom The Bible is not simply a text to be disavowed or 
defended against. 
Finally, dismissing religion and religious people as “the enemy” is historically 
blinkered. Progressive politics in the United States has not always been uniformly 
“against” or on the other side of religion.6Although there are good reasons to distrust 
and, even more strongly, protest the ways in which “religion” is currently being put 
to work in United States public life, legislation, and policies, the entry of religion 
into politics and public life is not in and of itself conservative. Nonetheless, when 
it comes to sexuality, religion is, by and large, invoked to conservative ends. Laws 
criminalizing consensual sodomy were an ur-example of this in the United States 
context. Ongoing battles over same-sex marriage are another. As a result, secularists, 
queer and otherwise, are not wrong to distrust public religious language or worry 
about the role of religion in United States public life. It is just that the story is far 
more complicated than usually supposed. 
One of the tasks Jakobsen and I set ourselves in Love the Sin is to complicate 
this story of a necessary antagonism between religion and sexuality. We suggest 
that the “danger” or “problem” that sexual freedom comes to represent cannot be 
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understood apart from the history of religion in the United States and, in particular, 
from the history of the under-realization of the religious freedom promised by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution:  “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 
Because all United States laws regulating homosexuality are, at base, religious in 
derivation, we contend that religious freedom is a structural condition of sexual 
freedom. In this essay, however, I want to take a different tack, sketching, in a 
preliminary way, some beneﬁts to queer theory and to lgbtq activisms of “getting 
religion.” A new or renewed openness to the categories of religious experience 
may pay unexpected dividends by revealing some surprising company—strange 
bedfellows, if you will. In what follows, I turn my attention to a relatively recent 
genre of religious self-narratives, the coming out of homosexuality story. This 
turning toward is also a turning back. 
***************
In July 1998, a coalition of ﬁfteen anti-gay groups took out a series of full-page 
ads in The New York Times, USA Today, and The Washington Post. The sponsoring 
organizations were:  Alliance for Traditional Marriage-Hawaii, American Family 
Association, Americans for Truth about Homosexuality, Center for Reclaiming 
America, Christian Family Network, Christian Coalition, Citizens for Community 
Values, Colorado for Family Values, Concerned Women for America, Coral Ridge 
Ministries, Family First, Family Research Council, Liberty Counsel, National 
League Foundation, and Kerusso Ministries. The particular ad that interests me 
appeared in the New York Times on the thirteenth of July and featured Anne Paulk, 
“wife, mother, former lesbian.”7 In the ﬁne print of the ad’s text is laid out Paulk’s 
story of coming out of homosexuality and into the “hope and healing” that a 
relationship to Christ can promise. 
Because the ad is the focus of an extended analysis in the third chapter of Love 
the Sin, I do not want to belabor the arguments presented there. It will sufﬁce in 
this context to offer a brief description of the advertisement and its scrupulously 
measured interplay of text and image. The upper third of the ad is dominated by a 
close-up of Paulk. It is the sort of photograph that would not be out of place in the 
weddings section of the Sunday Times. Paulk is a 30-something white woman with 
shoulder-length hair. She rests her face on her left hand, drawing attention to her 
wedding band and diamond ring, which prominently sign newfound commitments 
to God, husband, and self. Her story unfolds over seven sections of accompanying 
text, and it follows many of the conventions of the evangelical conversion narrative, 
complete with unexpected detours, willful evasions, and an arrival that is also a 
coming home. Once she did not know who she was and so she grasped at answers 
provided by others. Through self-study, appeals to a power greater than herself, 
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and intense social engagement with others like herself, she has been able to leave 
a false life behind and come to the truth of the self. Her story is at once particular 
and universal. She speaks of the “God-shaped hole in everyone’s heart” that only 
Jesus can ﬁll. Anne Paulk’s victory thus need not be hers alone. 
In staging Paulk’s self-discovery as a coming out of lesbianism narrative, the 
ad brilliantly and very knowingly recasts the relations between homosexuality 
and heterosexuality. Within the terms of the ad’s “repressive hypothesis,” 
heterosexuality, not homosexuality, is secular culture’s tabooed subject. This is 
not heterosexuality in any simple sense. It is not enough for Paulk to reorganize 
her desire away from women and to men. In fact, there is little in the text of the 
advertisement to suggest that Paulk now “desires” men. What she desires – and 
“we” can too -- is the “transforming love of Jesus Christ” (italics in original). 
The contours of Paulk’s conversion narrative, its confusions and arrival, will 
be familiar, perhaps painfully so, to many lesbians, gay men, and other “modern 
sexual subjects” who have struggled to come out to self and others about the 
felt truth of their sexual “identity” and desires. Moroever, even though the ad is 
obviously crafted with an eye to its impact on public political debates about gay 
identity and gay rights in the United States, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity 
of Paulk’s testimony. I would go so far as to suggest that, far from discrediting her, 
the public political re-purposing of Paulk’s testimony places Paulk and her story 
within a longer American history of Protestant revival, in which believers gave 
public witness to their sins and praised God for their salvation. Here is another 
place where performance-centered approaches can lend much to the discussion. 
These “exercise[s] in the collective performance of emotion,” to use John Corrigan’s 
terms,8 testiﬁed to the state of the individual participant’s soul at the same time 
that they also served to enact and assert group membership (usually over and 
against non-members). Consequently, I would argue even more explicitly now 
than Jakobsen and I did in Love the Sin that it is actually more helpful to take 
Paulk’s narrative at its word than to dismiss it as so much political packaging/
unapologetic homophobia on the part of the ad’s ﬁfteen co-sponsors or as wishful 
thinking/internalized homophobia on the part of Anne Paulk. Taking Paulk’s story 
at its word, as in some meaningful sense her words, attunes us to what may be 
shared structures of feeling between religious and sexual “identity.” Taking Paulk’s 
conversion experience seriously and locating its historical antecedents also point 
to the value of joining the history of sexuality (and its modern invention) to the 
history of religion (and its modern invention). In a deep sense, we moderns are 
that joining, to wit, hyphenated but never fully secular subjects.
In Love the Sin, Jakobsen and I suggested, in a footnote, that the ex-gay ad 
was thinkable as a kind of reverse discourse. The term “reverse discourse” is 
Michel Foucault’s and refers to a movement within discourse in which previously 
marginalized groups or identities come to speak on their own behalf, appropriating 
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the same vocabulary previously used to disqualify them as subjects. The one 
example Foucault offers of this phenomenon is an apparently approving one: 
homosexuality speaking in its own name.9 Anne Paulk’s ex-gay narrative—with its 
sampling of a genre (the homosexual coming out story) and a set of assumptions 
(a core self divided from itself)—is an important reminder that “reverse discourse” 
is a strategy not just deployed by those on the cultural margins, but also usable to 
reassert dominant values.10
I do not so much want to take back that footnote, as complicate it. First, 
for all the ways in which the ex-gay narrative reasserts dominant values—both 
heteronormativity and Christonormativity—this does not mean that the groups 
that co-sponsored the ad nor, crucially, the individuals who people these groups, 
necessarily occupy the cultural center in the United States. At minimum, many if not 
most “feel” marginalized by secular culture. Moreover, there may be more accuracy 
to this feeling of marginalization than many of us on the cultural and political left, 
who feel equally (if differently) marginalized by Protestant dominance, care to 
admit. By way of another example, think of the ﬁrestorm of often rancorous public 
debate over Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ. Despite a history of evangelical 
anti-Catholicism, evangelicals were the ﬁlm’s most passionate defenders. In part, 
this has to do with the way criticism of the ﬁlm was experienced by many Christian 
evangelicals in the United States as an attack upon their Christian identity.11 
This is a delicate issue. As Jakobsen and I have argued in another context, “. . . 
in the United States currently, we have a three-part relation among Christian 
secularism [that is, a secularism whose speciﬁcally Reform Protestant origins remain 
active], mainline Protestantism, and conservative Protestantism. The Christian right 
develops its cultural power both by drawing on its connection to the Christian aspect 
(itself supported by mainline Protestantism) of hegemonic Christian secularism and 
by claiming to be oppressed by that same secularism.”12
Second, if Paulk’s narrative is an example of reverse discourse it may also bear 
the trace of what Raymond Williams has called the “residual.” By residual, Williams 
means “certain experiences, meanings, and values” that cannot be expressed or 
veriﬁed or legitimated within the terms of dominant culture, but rather gain their 
resonance and life-value in relation to—as a relation to?—some previous social 
and cultural institution or formation.13 The residual is a survival strategy in at least 
two ways. First, it is the living remnant of cultural forms that belong to an earlier 
“phase” (and religion, notably, is Williams’s ﬁrst example of the residual); second, 
this remnant becomes a vehicle for self- and group expression for those whose 
experiences and values are, as it were, out of sync with the dominant. 
Williams’s discussion of the residual takes place in an enigmatically brief 
chapter entitled “Dominant, Residual, and Emergent.” This last term is the most 
valorized of the chapter’s three keywords. In the emergent “new meanings and 
values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationships are continually 
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being created,”14 while the residual is a term freighted with known-ness and past-
ness.
The teleological drift of Williams’s language—“new phase,” and “earlier social 
formations and phases of the cultural process”—seems at odds with his caution 
one chapter later, in his much-cited essay on “Structures of Feeling,” against 
prematurely foreclosing experience and its living, pulsing possibilities by naming 
it as past. In particular, he warns against assuming that the social is the ﬁxed and 
explicit, knowable and known to the last and ﬁrst degree.15 In fact, it is this worry 
about the habit of mind that regularly converts experience into the past tense of 
“ﬁnished products” that leads him to speak of “structures of feeling” instead of 
what he acknowledges is the “better and wider word,” namely, “structures of 
experience.”16 
The distinction between the emergent and the residual, though, is in service of 
something else. Williams wants to get at what counts as, and how we know, what is 
really oppositional, a-slant, to the dominant versus what is merely a “new phase of 
the dominant culture.”17 Relations between the dominant and the residual, Williams 
explains, are easier to understand (and thus take the measure of) than between the 
dominant and the emergent. This is so because, again in his words, “a large part 
of it [the residual] relates to earlier social formations and phases of the cultural 
process.”18 Signiﬁcantly, Williams does not seem to imagine that active ongoing 
engagement with the past can contribute to the formation of new meanings and 
values; does not imagine that the new relations he entitles “emergent” might include 
an altered relation to the past in the present. As historian Molly McGarry argues, 
though, the residual remains emergent.19 Alongside this trenchant observation we 
might also note, with Foucault, that “we are much more recent than we think.”20
To refer to the residual in Paulk’s ex-gay narrative is thus to situate the present 
meanings and values expressed in such testimonials in relation to earlier, but by 
no means ﬁnished, processes and professions of the modern self. In an intriguing 
essay on “Religious Experience and the Formation of the Early Enlightenment 
Self,” historian Jane Shaw argues that the rise of interiority and individuality, and 
the practices of self-examination associated with both, developed earlier and across 
more diverse social strata in England than in France.21 She identiﬁes several reasons 
for this, but the crucial factor to stress here is differences between Protestant and 
Catholic forms of self-examination–forms and practices that, in both England and 
France, were being secularized over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, with contested religious experiences being transformed, under pressure 
of scientiﬁc “reason,” into categories of medical diagnosis. Shaw, along with other 
religious studies scholars, here points us towards a recognition of the Protestantness 
of the modern rational self.22
Attending to this Protestant connection means making some major adjustments 
to Foucault’s history of sexuality, at minimum to its reception and circulation in an 
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Anglo-American context. If we have become, as Foucault argues in the ﬁrst volume 
of The History of Sexuality, a singularly confessing society, the chattering modern 
subject belongs as much, if not more, to such public and semi-public venues as 
meeting halls and public squares, church basements and theatres as to the screened 
off confessional box. To put the matter more bluntly:  in practice, Foucault’s talkative 
subject is closer to the Protestant testimonial than the Catholic confessional. 
I am still thinking through the implications of this for a history of sexuality 
and religion, but here, by way of conclusion (let’s call it an open ending), are some 
pointers towards future research:
(1) To speak of testimonial, rather than confessional, sexuality 
and subjectivity is to attune ourselves more systematically to 
the collective and performative contexts in which experiences, 
feelings, and practices make up people. 
(2) This performative casting of the modern sexual subject also 
recommends performance studies as a crucial methodological 
resource for thinking religion and sexuality side by side. 
(3) Much work remains to be done on the residual, perhaps 
connecting it to the queer historical touch that Carolyn Dinshaw 
has modeled in her recent Getting Medieval:  Sexualities and 
Communities, Pre- And Postmodern.23 There Dinshaw presses us 
to take seriously the possibility that the past can renew the present 
and project the future, and that such a renewal and projection 
are not the same thing as seeing the past only in the light of the 
present (or vice versa). 
(4) Narratives of cultural declension (from Augustine to Oprah, 
from Freud to Jerry Springer) will have to be rolled back to take 
account of the objectiﬁcation of emotion and commodiﬁcation 
of personal testimony that were early on a feature of Protestant 
practice (from Puritan diary-keeping to the Pentecostal revival 
tent to the spiritualist séance). 
(5) Some persistent contradictions in homophobic discourse—in 
which homosexuality is attacked for being “unnatural” and for 
being too “animalistic,” or in which one and the same person 
considers homosexaulity a sin (a moralizing discourse) and a 
sickness (medicalizing)—may evidence earlier nineteenth-century 
debates between religious and emergent scientiﬁc discourses, as 
well as within and between Protestant denominations, over such 
phenomena as trances, visions, speaking in tongues, communing 
with spirits, and religious emotion more generally. Were such 
phenomena to be classed as true religion, or false? Genuine 
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religious experience or hysteria? In such debates, a discourse 
of “the natural” was not on the side of science only. Spiritualist 
discourse about “natural religion” is a case in point. 
(6) Historical work with nineteenth-century primary texts has 
yielded a rich and richly evocative language of “come-outers.” The 
term refers to individuals who left—came out from—mainstream 
Protestantism and went into the range of more enthusiastic 
Protestant sects born in the American nineteenth century (e.g., 
Pentecostalism, Seventh Day Adventism, Christian Science). 
Come-outers also migrated towards spiritualism. Work remains 
to be done pursuing possible connections between this religious 
language of “come-outers” (as well as “closet devotions”) and 
twentieth-century understandings of “coming out of” the closet 
and “coming out as” homosexual. Such research might ask 
whether/how the secularization of sex and its subjects has erased 
or written over earlier religious discourses and worldviews and 
how such residual discourses offer alternative ways to imagine 
and enact sexual as well as religious subjectivities in the present.24 
What, for example, might be the points of connection between 
earlier and still active Christian understandings and practices of 
coming out from and the professions of sexual selfhood—coming 
out as—that help to make up the putatively secular and oh-so 
modern subject of sexuality?
(7) American religious freedom has come to mean, as Janet 
Jakobsen acutely observes, the freedom to act Protestant even 
when you are not. In view of this Christian dominance, how 
might tracing the cross-hatching of religious and sexual identities 
as structures of feeling help to interrupt some of the usual ways 
of telling the story of sexuality versus religion and “being” 
secular versus “having” values? This is more than an academic 
question of reﬁning our conceptual vocabulary. The stakes are 
no less than asking what kind of social world we can imagine 
and work towards. 
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